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Abstract. In an  important discussion of the problem of hiddenness, Michael 
Rea briefly presents and defends an argument from divine hiddenness which 
he thinks encapsulates the problem of divine hiddenness, and then develops 
a detailed and nuanced response to this argument. Importantly, Rea claims that 
his response does not depend on the commonly held theistic view that God allows 
hiddenness to secure human goods. In this paper I offer a detailed criticism of 
Rea’s account of what justifies God in allowing divine hiddenness, arguing that 
Rea’s response to the argument from divine hiddenness is unsuccessful.
The problem of divine hiddenness is one of the most significant objections 
to belief in God. More precisely, the problem of hiddenness can be 
embodied in an argument from hiddenness which concludes that God 
doesn’t, or likely doesn’t, exist. While the literature discussing arguments 
from divine hiddenness has focused on the argument from inculpable 
nonbelief as defended by J. L. Schellenberg,1 there have also been other 
important presentations of arguments from divine hiddenness.2 The 
1 J. L. Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1993); J. L. Schellenberg, ‘Divine Hiddenness Justifies Atheism’, in 
Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, ed. Michael L. Peterson and Raymond 
J. VanArragon (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2004), pp. 30–41; J. L. Schellenberg, The 
Wisdom to Doubt: A Justification of Religious Skepticism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 2007).
2 For examples, see Theodore M. Drange, ‘The Argument from Non-Belief ’, Religious 
Studies, 29, no. 4 (1993), 417–432; Theodore M. Drange, Nonbelief & Evil: Two Arguments 
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common core of these arguments is that there is an incompatibility, or 
evidential tension, between the existence of a perfectly good God and 
the existence of cases where significant truths about God lack epistemic 
support for certain persons.
In a  recent discussion of the problem of hiddenness, Michael Rea 
briefly presents and defends an argument from divine hiddenness which 
he thinks encapsulates the problem of divine hiddenness, and then 
develops a detailed and nuanced response to this argument.3 Importantly, 
Rea claims that his response to his argument from hiddenness does not 
depend on the commonly held theistic view that God allows hiddenness 
to secure human goods. Rea proposes that what justifies God in allowing 
hiddenness is the good of God acting in accord with the divine personality. 
Further, Rea contends that hiddenness is compatible with God’s concern 
for all people because God has provided a widely and readily accessible 
way to experience his presence despite divine hiddenness – humans can 
have mediated experiences of God made available via Christian scripture 
and liturgy.
In this paper I argue that Rea’s response to the argument from divine 
hiddenness is unsuccessful. In order to do this, in §1 I  outline Rea’s 
presentation of his version of the argument from divine hiddenness 
and then in §2 I  summarize Rea’s response to this argument from 
hiddenness. My critical evaluation is given in §3-§6. In §3, I argue that 
Rea’s stated understanding of ‘divine hiddenness’ (or as he prefers ‘divine 
silence’) makes it such that the argument he presents fails to embody 
a plausible problem of hiddenness. Accordingly, I modify his account of 
divine silence, attempting to stay as true to his stipulative definition as is 
feasible while providing a definition that grounds a plausible argument 
from hiddenness. In §4 I critique Rea’s appeal to the divine personality 
to justify divine hiddenness. In §5 I argue against Rea’s claim that God 
provides a way for persons who experience divine silence to encounter 
him through mediated experiences made available in scripture and 
for the Nonexistence of God (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1998); James A. Keller, 
‘The Hiddenness of God and the Problem of Evil’, International Journal for Philosophy 
of Religion, 37, no. 1 (1995), 13–24; Stephen Maitzen, ‘Divine Hiddenness and the 
Demographics of Theism’, Religious Studies, 42 (2006), 177–191.
3 Michael Rea, ‘Narrative, Liturgy, and the Hiddenness of God’, in Metaphysics 
and God: Essays in Honor of Eleonore Stump, ed. Kevin Timpe (New York: Routledge, 
2009), pp. 76–96. References to this work in the remainder of this paper will be made 
parenthetically in the text.
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liturgy. Finally, in §6 I  challenge Rea’s claim that the availability of 
mediated experiences of God makes divine silence compatible with 
God’s concern for the well-being of all people.
§1. REA’S ARGUMENT FROM HIDDENNESS
In order to offer a response to the problem of hiddenness, Rea begins by 
stating and defending an argument from hiddenness. His argument is 
presented as a reductio. If we assume that God exists, then the following 
mutually inconsistent claims also seem true:
P1: God has allowed himself to remain hidden from many people.
P2: It would be bad for an omnipotent, omniscient God to remain 
hidden from anyone.
P3: God, being perfectly good, cannot do anything that is bad.
I refer to this argument as Rea’s inconsistent triad (RIT). (Unless I indicate 
otherwise, when I refer to the argument from hiddenness, I am referring 
to RIT.)
Rea doesn’t give any defence of P3, nor does he need to, since neither 
proponents nor opponents of arguments from hiddenness question 
the claim that if God exists, he would be perfectly good, nor that God’s 
goodness would entail that he cannot do anything that is bad.
Regarding support for P1, Rea claims that defences of the existence 
of hiddenness standardly cite something like the truth of the following 
two facts (p. 76):
Inconclusive Evidence: For many people, the available a priori and 
empirical evidence in support of God’s existence is inconclusive: one 
can be fully aware of it and at the same time rationally believe that 
God does not exist.
Absence of Religious Experience: Many people – believers and 
unbelievers alike – have never had an experience that seems to them 
to be a direct experience or awareness of the love or presence of God; 
and those who do have such experiences have them rarely.
Rea grants that these two facts are true. He argues, however, that the fact 
that inconclusive evidence and absence of religious experience 
both obtain is better understood as ‘divine silence’ rather than ‘divine 
hiddenness’ (see pp. 78-81). Rea then stipulates that when he speaks of 
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divine silence he ‘will be speaking simply of the fact that inconclusive 
evidence and absence of religious experience both obtain’ (p. 81). 
Though Rea doesn’t update RIT after arguing for the terminological 
change from ‘divine hiddenness’ to ‘divine silence’, it will aid in 
understanding the argument to update RIT as follows:4
P1*: God has allowed inconclusive evidence and absence of 
religious experience.
P2*: It would be bad for an  omnipotent, omniscient God to allow 
inconclusive evidence and absence of religious experience.
P3: God, being perfectly good, cannot do anything that is bad.
(Since I don’t find the terminological preference for divine silence rather 
than divine hiddenness as important as Rea does, I use divine silence 
and divine hiddenness interchangeably. Unless I  indicate otherwise, 
I use these terms in the way that Rea has stipulated.)
Concerning support for P2*, Rea claims that the basic problem with 
divine silence is that it seems inconsistent with the following thesis 
(a thesis that seems entailed by God’s perfect goodness):
Divine Concern: God strongly desires to promote the well-being of 
all his rational creatures, both now and in the afterlife. (p. 77)
Rea rightly notes, however, that P2* is true only if divine hiddenness 
does not promote any good the promotion of which would justify God 
in permitting hiddenness. So the proponent of the argument from 
hiddenness claims that divine silence is all-things-considered bad for 
God to allow, because it is inconsistent with Divine Concern. The 
opponent of the argument (assuming that he grants the existence of 
divine silence) must defend a God-justifying good which ‘would justify 
God in permitting whatever bad things come from divine hiddenness’ 
(p. 77).
§2. REA’S RESPONSE TO RIT
Rea’s intentions in responding to the RIT can be summarized as follows. 
Rea notes that most attempts to identify God-justifying goods assume 
4 This change is also supported by Rea’s statement that the proponent of the hiddenness 
argument can ‘replace talk about divine hiddenness with talk about the obtaining of 
inconclusive evidence and absence of religious experience’ and the argument 
‘would then proceed with much the same force as the original’ (p. 77).
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that the good (or goods) which justify hiddenness must be a  human 
good. Rea aims to buck this trend, intending ‘to defend a response to the 
problem of divine hiddenness that is consistent with the following claim’ 
(p. 78):
No Human Good: It is not the case that God permits inconclusive 
evidence and absence of religious experience in order to secure 
human goods.
Rea will then argue that ‘even if no human good is true, divine 
hiddenness does not cast doubt on divine concern’ (p. 78). He thinks 
this is so if the following is true:
Divine Self-Disclosure: God has provided some widely and 
readily accessible way of finding him and experiencing his presence 
despite silence.
Rea will then argue that divine self-disclosure is in fact true.
I think that Rea’s response can be stated as a defence of the following 
three separate theses (these are my statements of Rea’s theses, not his):
T1: The good of divine acts which express God’s personality justifies 
divine silence (making Rea’s greater good account compatible with 
no human good).
T2: Even if God does not permit divine silence in order to secure 
human goods, divine silence is compatible with divine concern so 
long as divine self-disclosure is true.
T3: Divine self-disclosure is true: Biblical narratives and liturgical 
acts are means by which we might find and experience the presence 
of God in the midst of divine silence.
§2.1. Defending T1
Rea recognizes that ‘it is easy to see why one might think’ divine silence is 
incompatible with divine concern (p. 81). Consider the experience of 
Mother Teresa, who longed to experience God’s presence but (according 
to her private writings) did not experience God’s presence at many times 
in her life. How could a compassionate God refrain from answering the 
cries of Mother Teresa and others like her? (pp. 81-2) A human parent 
would surely draw near to his child and offer words of comfort and 
affection; shouldn’t we expect at least as much from a perfectly loving 
divine being?
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In response, Rea claims that inferring that divine silence is 
incompatible with divine concern commits an error often committed 
in complaints about the behaviour of humans; it ‘depends on a particular 
interpretation of behaviour that can in fact be interpreted in any of 
a number of different ways, depending upon what assumptions we make 
about the person’s beliefs, desires, motives, and overall personality’ 
(p. 82). To make an accurate interpretation of someone’s behaviour, one 
must know things like the person’s cultural background, what sort of 
social norms she is likely to know and respect, her views about what 
various kinds of behaviours communicate, and so on. And if we need 
this kind of information to interpret human behaviour, then we should 
be slow to interpret the behaviour of the God of the universe. Even with 
the witness of Christian Scripture, Rea thinks ‘we have precious little by 
way of clear and reliable information about God’s personality and about 
his general style of interacting with others’ (p. 82).
Since we don’t know these key facts about God necessary for 
interpreting his behaviour, divine silence may simply be the result of 
an  expression of God’s unique personality and/or God’s preferences 
about how to interact with creatures like us. This possibility becomes 
Rea’s proposed God-justifying good: ‘ ... divine silence is an outgrowth of 
the divine personality or of God’s preferences about how to interact with 
creatures like us ... ’ (p. 86) Since it is intrinsically good for God to live 
out God’s personality, this intrinsic good justifies God allowing divine 
silence. Further, the good of God acting according to his personality is 
not a human good, so Rea’s proposed God-justifying good is compatible 
with no human good.
Rea acknowledges that God acting in accord with his personality does 
result in suffering, which seems to indicate that God is unconcerned for 
those who experience divine silence. But he defends as plausible the 
following claim:
It might be that our suffering in the face of divine silence is unreasonable, 
due more to our own immaturity or dysfunction than to any lack of 
kindness on God’s part. Perhaps it results from our own untrusting, 
uncharitable interpretations of divine silence, or from an inappropriate 
refusal to accept God for who God is and to accept God’s preferences 
about when and in what ways to communicate with us.5
5 Rea’s defends this claim at length (pp. 84-85, 87).
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§2.2. Defending T2
Rea acknowledges, however, that if ‘God had provided no way for us to 
find him or experience his presence in the midst of his silence’, divine 
silence would be incompatible with divine concern (p. 83). Rea thinks, 
however, that divine self-disclosure is true.
Divine Self-Disclosure: God has provided some widely and 
readily accessible way of finding him and experiencing his presence 
despite silence.
Rea seems to take it as obvious that T2 is true: if there is a ‘widely and 
readily accessible way’ of experiencing God despite divine silence, then 
divine silence would not conflict with divine concern.
§2.3. Defending T3
Rea avers that most discussions of divine hiddenness assume that God 
has provided some widely and readily accessible way of finding him only 
if one or both of inconclusive evidence and absence of religious 
experience are false. This position, however, ‘ignores ... the possibility 
of mediated experiences of the presence of God through media that are 
themselves widely and readily available’ (p. 88).
Very roughly, Rea’s mediated experiences are not direct experiences 
of the object experienced, but provide a person with much if not all of 
the propositional and non-propositional information one would get via 
direct experience. Rea builds on the work of Eleonore Stump to argue 
that mediated experiences of God are available through the biblical 
narrative.6 Stump’s account is summarized by Rea as follows. A second-
person experience is a conscious experience of another person as a person, 
rather than as a  mere object. Turning to the biblical narrative, Stump 
claims that many biblical narratives are second-person accounts, by which 
she means they are narratives that communicate the content of a second 
person experience. Most importantly for Rea’s purposes, Stump claims 
that second-person accounts can communicate roughly the same kind 
of information that one gets from a second-person experience of God 
6 Rea cites Eleonore Stump, ‘The Problem of Evil: Analytic Philosophy and Narrative’, 
in Analytic Theology: New Essays in the Philosophy of Theology, ed. Oliver D. Crisp 
and Michael C. Rea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp.  251–264; Eleonore 
Stump, Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010).
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by making the original experience available through the narrative to the 
reader. Put in his own terms, Rea claims that the biblical second-person 
accounts mediate second-person experiences of God. The upshot for 
Rea is that if this account is right, through reading the biblical narrative, 
a person can have a mediated experience of God.
Rea also thinks that something similar can be said about liturgical 
actions. The Eucharist and baptism are commemorative of past events, 
and can possibly be ways of making present the things commemorated, 
perhaps offering mediated experience of God. (Rea has less to say about 
how this works in liturgical actions, and seems less confident that 
mediated experiences are made available through liturgical actions.)
Rea concludes that if his account of mediated experiences is correct, 
‘then (given that Biblical narrative and the right sorts of liturgical 
forms ... are readily available) divine self-disclosure is true.’ He then 
reiterates that ‘if divine self-disclosure is true, then ... divine silence 
is unproblematic’ (p. 93).
§3. EVALUATING REA’S PRESENTATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
FROM DIVINE HIDDENNESS
Below I will offer critical evaluations of T1, T2, and T3. But before doing 
that, I must evaluate Rea’s presentation of the argument from hiddenness. 
Rea’s presentation of the argument from hiddenness is not dependent 
on any extant version of an argument from hiddenness in the literature, 
so it’s important to consider whether the argument he’s presented is 
plausible. To begin, I overview the support Rea gives for the key premise 
of the argument. I then argue that Rea’s stipulative definition of divine 
silence results in his presentation of the argument from hiddenness 
failing to embody a plausible problem of hiddenness for theism.
Recall the updated version of RIT:
P1*: God has allowed inconclusive evidence and absence of 
religious experience.
P2*: It would be bad for an  omnipotent, omniscient God to allow 
inconclusive evidence and absence of religious experience.
P3: God, being perfectly good, cannot do anything that is bad.
According to Rea, the key premise P2* is supported by the apparent 
inconsistency of inconclusive evidence and absence of religious 
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experience with divine concern. Rea gives two lines of reasoning for 
thinking that divine silence is incompatible with divine concern. I’ll refer 
to these as A and B:
A: All of the major theistic religions agree that belief in God is vital 
for our present and future well-being. But a world in which God is 
hidden is one in which God is doing far less than he could (if he 
is omnipotent and omniscient) to promote rational theistic belief. 
Hence, it is one in which God is doing far less than he could to 
promote our well-being. (p. 77)
B: Divine hiddenness is a source of suffering in believers, who often 
feel abandoned, neglected, unloved, or rejected by the being to whom 
they have devoted their lives and whom they have been taught to 
regard as their loving heavenly Father. (p. 77)
As an  initial comment, B seems unduly narrow. It should include not 
just believers, but also nonbelievers who desire to believe in God but 
experience divine silence. Their suffering can be as serious as the suffering 
of believers who experience divine silence.7 So this line of support can be 
made more precise as:
B*: Divine silence is a  source of suffering in believers who feel 
abandoned, neglected, unloved, or rejected by God, and is a source 
of suffering for unbelievers because they lack the belief in God they 
desire.
Having clarified the support for P2*, I now turn to a problem for that 
premise. The problem with P2* is this: it is possible that inconclusive 
evidence and absence of religious experience both obtain without 
there being any clear incompatibility or even evidential tension with 
divine concern. Here’s why. inconclusive evidence states that many 
people lack a  priori and empirical evidence sufficient to justify belief 
in God; absence of religious experience asserts that many people 
have never had a direct religious experience which could justify belief 
in God. But the truth of these two facts is compatible with every person 
in the world having evidence sufficient for knowledge-level justification 
for belief in God and knowledge-level justification for belief that God is 
concerned for their well-being and actively involved in their lives.
7 For a good description of the suffering that some nonbelievers seem to experience 
because of divine silence, see Schellenberg, The Wisdom to Doubt, pp. 227–235.
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Consider the following possible scenario. The many people who lack 
a  priori and empirical evidence to justify belief that God exists (i.e., 
who make inconclusive evidence true) have frequent experiences 
of the loving presence of God. These people have direct evidence for 
God’s existence via their direct experiences of God, and because of their 
frequent religious experiences they could not reasonably feel neglected 
or abandoned by God. Additionally, the many people who fail to have 
direct experiences of God (i.e., who make absence of religious 
experience true) have knowledge-level justification via their available 
a  priori and empirical evidence. Further, their a  priori and empirical 
evidence provides knowledge-level justification for beliefs about God’s 
love for them and continual involvement in their life.
If it is possible that divine silence is true while every person has 
knowledge-level justification for belief that God exists and that God loves 
them and is active in their life, then the truth of inconclusive evidence 
and absence of religious experience in itself is not in any way in 
tension with divine concern. So the problem with Rea’s definition of 
divine silence is that it does not entail any problem of hiddenness. Since 
this is the case, a response to RIT, with divine silence understood as Rea 
stipulates, doesn’t require the account of the God-justifying good that 
Rea develops, or any account of a God-justifying good. Rather, one can 
simply deny P2*.
If Rea’s presentation of the argument from hiddenness is to embody 
the problem of hiddenness in a  plausible way, his account of divine 
silence needs to be modified such that it’s plausible to think that silence 
is pro tanto bad because of its tension with divine concern. Seeking to 
modify Rea’s account as little as possible, I propose the following revised 
account of divine silence:
Inconclusive Evidence & Lack Of Religious Experience*: 
For many people, their available a priori and empirical evidence in 
support of God’s existence is inconclusive (they can be fully aware of 
it and at the same time rationally believe that God does not exist), and 
they have never had an experience that seems to them to be a direct 
experience or awareness of the love or presence of God.
If divine silence is understood as inconclusive evidence & lack of 
religious experience*, then there is a plausible case to be made for 
the inconsistency of divine silence and divine concern. Additionally, 
while it’s the case that this modified account of divine silence asserts 
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more than Rea’s initial account, it would be somewhat surprising to 
think that Rea’s inconclusive evidence and absence of religious 
experience both obtain but deny that inconclusive evidence & lack 
of religious experience* obtains. So hereafter, to make plausible Rea’s 
argument from divine hiddenness, divine silence will be understood as 
inconclusive evidence & lack of religious experience*. Because 
of this, RIT must be modified as:
P1#: God has allowed inconclusive evidence & absence of 
religious experience*.
P2#: It would be bad for an  omniscient, omnipotent God to allow 
inconclusive evidence & absence of religious experience*.
P3: God, being perfectly good, cannot do anything that is bad.
§4. EVALUATING T1
Recall that Rea intends for his account of what justifies hiddenness to be 
compatible with no human good, which says that it is not the case that 
God permits divine silence in order to secure human goods. I summarized 
Rea’s account of the non-human good that justifies divine silence as
T1: The good of divine acts which express God’s personality justifies 
divine silence (making Rea’s greater good account compatible with 
no human good).
Rea’s argument for T1 has two components. First, Rea attempts to 
undercut the inference from divine silence to the conclusion that God 
is unloving or unconcerned for humanity. Second, Rea puts forward 
the hypothesis that divine silence is a  result of divine action that 
expresses God’s personality, and since God expressing his personality 
is intrinsically good, this good might justify divine silence without any 
reference to human goods. Here I offer brief criticism of both steps (§4.1 
and §4.2) and then point out a further problem for Rea’s account of what 
justifies God in allowing divine silence (§4.3).
§4.1. Interpreting divine silence
Rea’s case against inferring from divine hiddenness that God is 
unloving or unconcerned can be summarized as follows (hereafter the 
interpretation scepticism argument):
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IS1: In order to understand someone’s behaviour, one must know 
substantial information about the person’s beliefs, desires, motives, 
dispositions, and overall personality.
IS2: But when it comes to God, we know very little about these factors.
IS3: So we cannot understand why God is silent.
IS4: So we shouldn’t interpret divine silence as expressing lack of love 
or concern.
Rea motivates IS1 with a  couple of examples and explanations of our 
inability to understand human behaviour. Here’s one of his examples, 
which I will refer to as ‘Hallway Silence’:
Hallway Silence: A  senior member of your department doesn’t 
greet you in the hallway. Is he offended by you? Does he think you’re 
beneath him? Is he depressed and having a bad day? Or is that just 
him, a  little preoccupied and not really noticing his surroundings? 
(p. 82)
Rea is correct that on the evidence that I have here, any of the options 
explaining my colleague’s behaviour are viable. So there is something 
that I cannot understand about my colleague’s behaviour. But there are 
still reasonable interpretations of my colleague’s behaviour that I  can 
make in this case. We can have a fair bit of knowledge upon which to 
build interpretations of a person’s actions by knowing that a person is 
a normally functioning human being. Human beings are motivated by 
love, fear, physical pleasure, moral considerations, and a host of other 
psychological factors, and they have practical reasoning skills that 
enable them to act on their motivational states. So concerning hallway 
silence, for example, I  seem perfectly justified in interpreting my 
colleague’s behaviour as not intended to ascertain how my day is going.
Further, the reasons for not interpreting the silence in hallway 
silence as an  expression of unconcern or disdain go beyond mere 
lack of information about the other person. It’s not simply that I don’t 
have enough information about my colleague’s personality, beliefs, or 
cultural expectations; rather, it’s reasonable to withhold interpreting his 
behaviour in part because we can think of multiple plausible explanations 
for his behaviour (as shown in the options Rea gives in the case). We 
know that people are sometimes preoccupied when walking down the 
hall. We know that some people are introverted, or that some people 
aren’t comfortable talking with people in passing, etc. Contrast this with 
a case like the following:
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Non-Intervening Colleague: You meet a  colleague in the hall, 
look him in the eye, and say ‘I have an important question I need to 
ask you’. He ignores you and looks the other way. Just then, you feel 
severe pain in your chest, and collapse to the floor. You look at your 
colleague again and ask ‘please call for help!’ but again he ignores you 
and looks the other way.
Assume that you know this person has a conversational knowledge of 
English, and you have good reason to believe that he hears you and 
sees you. Perhaps you shouldn’t attribute this behaviour to a particular 
malicious intention. But no matter how little I know about this person, 
I  am justified in believing that his behaviour is incompatible with his 
concern for me. This is so because, whatever the details of a  person’s 
background and personality, actions that are hurtful or undermine 
another’s well being are not loving, unless we have a reason to think that 
the action (though undermining my well being) is necessary for a good 
purpose.
It’s true that substantial information about the person’s beliefs, 
desires, motives, dispositions, and overall personality is necessary for 
a full understanding of a person’s behaviour. But we can make reasonable 
interpretations providing a partial understanding of a person’s behaviour 
even if we lack some information about these characteristics of the 
person. The parallel of this point with interpreting divine hiddenness is 
important. The proponent of the argument from hiddenness claims that 
divine silence is incompatible with divine concern. She can recognize 
that to give a  specific interpretation of a  person’s action we may need 
to know a  good bit about a  person, but also think that it’s reasonable 
to believe an action is incompatible with promoting the well-being of 
another without knowing much about the person. And I  take it that 
the proponent of the hiddenness argument sees divine silence as more 
like the case of non-intervening colleague rather than the case of 
hallway silence.
Perhaps what does the heavy lifting in Rea’s argument is IS2. Rea 
stresses that we know very little about the factors of God’s personality 
that would allow us to understand his interaction with us. Consider the 
following statements:
Even granting the complete reliability and transparency of Biblical 
testimony about God, we have precious little by way of clear and reliable 
information about God’s personality and about his general ‘style’ of 
130 ROSS PARKER
interacting with others; and to ask about God’s ‘culture’ or about what 
sorts of social norms God would likely recognize and respect seems 
to border on the overly anthropomorphic. God is as alien and ‘wholly 
other’ from as it is possible for another person to be. (p. 83)
 ... the most enigmatic, eccentric, and complicated people we might ever 
encounter in literature or in real life are, by comparison with God, utterly 
familiar and mundane. (p. 85)
While what Rea says here is in part correct, the case seems overstated. 
Consider first that Rea acknowledges that we do know an  important 
truth about God’s personality; namely, divine concern:
Divine Concern: God strongly desires to promote the well-being of 
all his rational creatures, both now and in the afterlife.
If divine concern is true, then we have a solid understanding of one of 
God’s fundamental desires and motives. So when we attempt to interpret 
divine silence (or other of God’s actions) it’s not the case that we know 
little of importance concerning God’s beliefs and desires. Rather we 
interpret divine silence in light of the truth that if there is a God, he has 
perfect love for all humans and desires their ultimate well-being. Even 
if there is much we don’t know about the beliefs, desires, motives, and 
dispositions of a perfect Divine being, if divine silence seems to clearly 
not promote human well-being, then we have some reason to interpret it 
as incompatible with divine concern.8
Rea thinks that the considerations he gives against interpreting 
the actions of persons support a  strong agnosticism concerning the 
interpretation of divine silence:
8 Additionally, Rea overstates his case when he claims that even with Christian 
Scripture, there is little we can know about the way God would interact with humans. 
The Christian Scriptures give many affirmations from which one would be able to 
know something about God’s beliefs, desires, and overall personality. To take just one 
example, Scripture commends that God’s personality and interaction with humans can 
be understood analogously with what a human parent would do in dealing with a child. 
Consider this statement of Jesus from the Sermon on the Mount: ‘Ask, and it will be given 
to you; seek, and you will find; knock, and it will be opened to you. For everyone who 
asks receives, and the one who seeks finds, and to the one who knocks it will be opened. 
Or which one of you, if his son asks him for bread, will give him a stone? Or if he asks 
for a fish, will give him a serpent? If you then, who are evil, know how to give good gifts 
to your children, how much more will your Father who is in heaven give good things to 
those who ask him!’ (Matthew 7:7-11 ESV)
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Silence is an  interpretable kind of behaviour; and, as with any other 
person, God’s behaviour doesn’t wear its interpretation on its sleeve – 
it can be understood only in the light of substantial background 
information. To be sure, divine silence could be an indication of divine 
rejection or lack of concern. But that interpretation is entirely optional, 
given our evidence. (p. 83, my emphasis)
This is too strong a conclusion. It doesn’t follow from the truth that the 
behaviour of persons is interpretable and our lack of robust knowledge 
of the divine personality that there is no good reason to interpret divine 
silence as incompatible with divine concern. Rea’s considerations 
concerning interpreting agential behaviour should remind us to be 
careful and circumspect in inferring God’s intentions in allowing divine 
silence. But it seems clear that we know enough about what a perfect 
being would do such that divine silence is a pro tanto bad state of affairs, 
such that if one wants to deny P2# (as Rea is attempting to do), then one 
needs to provide a reason to think that divine silence promotes a good 
‘the promotion of which would justify God in permitting whatever bad 
things come from divine hiddenness’ (p.  77). As Richard Swinburne 
(an influential opponent of the argument from hiddenness) states
All knowledge is good, but especially knowledge of deep truths about 
the Universe and our place in it, who or what is the source of our 
being, and more truths about our duties and the good actions beyond 
duty which we can do ... As our creator, God will seek to interact with 
us. He will want us to feel his presence, to tell him things and ask 
him to do things; and he will want to tell us things ... and to do good 
things with us, to cooperate with us in producing further goods.9
Swinburne thinks it’s clear that ‘God will, for these and other reasons ... 
want us to know that he exists’.10 This is why theists like Swinburne give 
accounts of plausible goods which could justify God allowing divine 
silence – they recognize that God would not withhold evidence of his 
existence unless he had a good reason to do so. So I now turn to consider 
Rea’s account of what justifies God in allowing hiddenness.




§4.2. Rea’s Defence of his God-justifying Good
Recall that Rea states that he intends to ‘defend a response to the problem 
of divine hiddenness that is consistent with [no human good]’ (p. 78). 
This can be understood in a couple of different ways. One might think 
that Rea intends to provide an  account of a  God-justifying good and 
argue that this account is plausibly true. Rea does not, however, give any 
argument to support the conclusion that his God-justifying good is true, 
or even reasonable to believe. Rather, the structure of his defence for his 
God-justifying good is given in the following passage:
To be sure, divine silence could be an indication of divine rejection or 
lack of concern. But that interpretation is entirely optional, given our 
evidence. Divine silence might instead simply be a reflection of the fact 
that God prefers to communicate with us and to draw us into his presence 
in ways other than ones that would render [divine silence] false. It might 
just be a reflection of God’s personality, so to speak. (p. 83)
Another point concerning Rea’s defence of his God-justifying good 
is important to note. Rea nowhere gives an  account of what divine 
belief, desire, or motive might motivate God acting in such a way that 
divine silence occurs. His appeal is to an unknown aspect of the divine 
personality.
Here’s why I think this is inadequate. Proponents of arguments from 
hiddenness have provided reasons to think that P2# is true. They argue 
that God allowing divine silence is bad. If the interpretation of divine 
silence as bad was ‘entirely optional, given our evidence’, then putting 
forward a God-justifying good that’s merely possible may be sufficient 
for thinking that P2# is false. But I’ve argued that though divine silence 
is an interpretable behaviour, this doesn’t undermine the case that divine 
silence is a pro tanto bad state of affairs. Rea needs to give a reason to think 
that divine silence, though pro tanto bad, is not all-things-considered bad 
by developing a plausible account of why God allows divine silence. Rea’s 
claim – that possibly God has an unknown part of his personality that 
is such that acting from his personality leads to divine silence – doesn’t 
give a reason to think that divine silence is not all-things-considered bad. 
In other words, since reasons have been given for the claim that divine 
silence is incompatible with divine concern (see A and B* above), and 
because Rea’s interpretation scepticism argument is not successful, 
the onus is on the opponent of the argument from hiddenness to give 
some reason to think that there is a good that justifies God in allowing 
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hiddenness. Simply appealing to the possibility of an unknown divine 
motivation fails to count as a defence of a God-justifying good.11
§4.3. Another Problem for Rea’s God-justifying Good
I  have argued that Rea’s case against inferring that God is unloving/
unconcerned from divine silence and his positing of God’s actions 
expressing the divine personality as his account of the God-justifying 
good both have problems. However, even if my account here is 
unsuccessful, there is another problem for T1. Rea admits that the good 
of God acting from the divine personality justifies hiddenness only if 
divine self-disclosure is also true:
Divine Self-Disclosure: God has provided some widely and 
readily accessible way of finding him and experiencing his presence 
despite silence.
But if divine self-disclosure is a  necessary condition for justifying 
divine silence, then it seems inaccurate to claim that what justifies divine 
silence is the good of God living out the divine personality. Rather, for 
Rea what justifies divine silence is the good of God living out the divine 
personality in conjunction with the availability of means to find God 
and experience him despite divine silence. So even if my criticism of T1 
is unsuccessful, Rea’s account of what justifies God in allowing divine 
silence is only as good as his case for T2 and T3. I accordingly evaluate 
these two theses in the next two sections.
§5. AGAINST T3
Recall T3:
T3: Divine self-disclosure is true: Biblical narratives and liturgical 
acts are means by which we might find and experience the presence 
of God in the midst of divine silence.
Two preliminary points. First, I  limit my discussion of Rea’s case for 
divine self-disclosure being met through mediated experiences of 
11 There are clear parallels between Rea’s appeal to an unknown component of the 
divine personality and the sceptical theist’s response to the argument from evil. The issue 
of sceptical theism has been discussed extensively in the recent literature, and I can’t do 
justice to that discussion here.
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God made available through biblical narratives. My criticisms, however, 
could be applied, mutatis mutandis, to what Rea says about mediated 
experiences via liturgy.
Second, in order for Rea’s account of mediated experiences of God to 
be plausible, Stump’s position that second person accounts of God given 
in certain biblical narratives make available second-person experiences 
of God must be true. Rea gives no argument for the truth of this position; 
he simply assumes it in developing his account of how divine self-
disclosure is true. To evaluate Stump’s position, however, is beyond the 
scope of this paper, so I will grant this part of Rea’s account.
The fundamental problem for T3 is that people who experience 
divine silence seem to not be in the epistemic position necessary to 
have mediated experiences of God via biblical narratives. Concerning 
what is required to have a mediated experience of God through biblical 
narratives, Rea states:
A  certain kind of ‘seeing as’ is a  necessary condition for experiencing 
the presence of another person as such: one has to consciously regard 
the other as a person ... Likewise, then, one would expect that a similar 
sort of ‘seeing as’ would be involved in having mediated experiences of 
the presence of another person. Thus, for example, if one were to read 
a story about Fred’s second-person experiences of Wilma while failing to 
see Wilma as a (real) person ... the experiences conveyed by the narrative 
would be different and, in that event, there would be no reason to think 
that the narrative would in any sense be mediating Wilma’s presence. 
If this is right, then whether Biblical narratives mediate the presence of 
God will depend importantly upon whether one takes those narratives to 
be reporting real experiences of God. (p. 91, emphasis mine)
So in order to have a mediated experience of God through the biblical 
narrative, one must take those narratives to be reporting real experiences 
of God. The most plausible way to understand this requirement is 
that one would have to believe that the biblical narrative reports real 
experiences of God. But I argued in §3 that in order for Rea’s argument 
from hiddenness to be plausible, divine silence must be understood as 
Inconclusive Evidence & Lack Of Religious Experience*. Those 
who experience divine silence are such that ‘their available a priori and 
empirical evidence in support of God’s existence is inconclusive (they can 
be fully aware of it and at the same time rationally believe that God does 
not exist), and they have never had an experience that seems to them 
135REA’S RESPONSE TO DIVINE HIDDENNESS
to be a direct experience or awareness of the love or presence of God’. 
So people who experience divine silence do not have epistemic reason 
to justify belief that God exists, which means they don’t have reason to 
take the biblical narratives as reporting real experiences of God. Since 
this is so, those who experience divine silence should not believe that 
the biblical narratives are reporting real experiences of God. And this, 
according to Rea’s own account, would keep them from being able to 
have a mediated experience of God via the biblical narratives.
Rea has responded to this criticism in correspondence as follows.12 
Consider a  person who lacks evidence for God’s existence because he 
accepts an  argument from hiddenness against God’s existence; i.e., if 
he did not accept the argument from hiddenness he would justifiably 
believe in God. This person then comes to believe that biblical narratives 
(if true) could provide mediated experiences of God. This could provide 
a  defeater for the reasons he had for accepting the argument from 
hiddenness, such that he would be open to experiencing the presence of 
God via the biblical narrative.
This is an  interesting response, but it fails to undercut the general 
point I’m trying to make. First, this reply only shows that those who 
(i) experience divine silence because of hiddenness and then (ii) come 
to see that it’s possibly true that one can have a mediated experience of 
God have reason to believe the biblical narratives are true, and thus be 
open to mediated experiences of God. But it seems implausible to think 
that most people who experience divine silence fail to believe in God 
because of the argument from hiddenness. So for those who lack a priori, 
empirical, or experiential evidence for God’s existence for reasons other 
than an argument from hiddenness, they still lack a  reason to believe 
that the biblical narratives are true and thus fail to be in an epistemic 
position to have a  mediated experience of God via scripture. Second, 
for the person whose reason for unbelief is defeated by considering the 
possibility of mediated experiences of God, it is not true that this person 
has the possibility of experiencing God despite silence (which is the claim 
of T3). Rather, this person now has the reason that was keeping him 
from justifiably believing in God defeated. So he no longer experiences 
divine silence – he has a justified belief in God.
Another possible response that Rea could make is as follows: while 
the person who experiences divine silence epistemically ought not 
12 Personal e-mail correspondence, June 26, 2013.
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believe that the biblical narratives are reporting real experiences of God, 
he could have pragmatic reasons to believe that the biblical narratives 
are reporting real experiences of God. In response, believing that the 
biblical narratives are reporting real experiences of God for pragmatic 
reasons when one has insufficient evidence to justify this belief seems 
psychologically implausible. Most accounts of belief agree that belief is 
synchronically involuntary. As Swinburne states, ‘In general, a  person 
cannot choose what to believe there and then. Believing is something 
that happens to someone, not something that he does.’ 13 If this is the case, 
one cannot choose to believe that the biblical narratives are reporting real 
experiences of God at time t on the basis of pragmatic reasons. So in 
order to believe that biblical narratives are reporting real experiences of 
God, one would have to act in such a way that over time (a) one convinces 
oneself that the biblical narratives are true when one doesn’t have good 
evidence for this, or (b) one comes to have evidence that supports this 
proposition. If (a), then it seems like the person has done something 
irrational, and it seems problematic that a perfectly loving God would 
require people who experience divine silence to be irrational in order to 
be able to experience God despite divine silence. If (b), then by having 
evidence for believing that the biblical narratives are true the person 
would have evidence that supports belief in God, which would mean that 
she would no longer experience divine silence. So I conclude that even if 
Rea’s account of mediated experiences of God is correct, only those for 
whom God is not hidden will be able to have mediated experiences of 
God, which means that we should deny T3.
§6. AGAINST T2
In the previous sections I  argued against T1 and T3. In this section 
I argue that even if we grant these two theses (which again, I have argued 
against), there is a fundamental problem for T2:
T2: Even if God does not permit divine silence in order to secure 
human goods, divine silence is compatible with divine concern so 
long as divine self-disclosure is true.
The problem is that a gap exists between divine concern and divine 
self-disclosure. Divine concern claims that ‘God strongly desires to 
13 Richard Swinburne, Faith and Reason, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005), p. 24.
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promote the well-being of all of his rational creatures’. But divine self-
disclosure only claims that God has made a way to experience him that 
is ‘widely and readily accessible’.
In order for divine concern to be compatible with divine silence, 
the way made available to experience God needs to make God accessible 
to all those who experience divine silence. Rea seems to acknowledge 
this, stating that
If we have been entirely cut off from God’s presence, God then has done 
or permitted something that is both devastatingly harmful to us and 
totally out of our control, and it is much harder to make plausible the 
suggestion that God has taken reasonable steps to be compassionate 
towards us in the midst of our suffering. (p. 88)
If God desires the well-being of all his rational creatures (including those 
who experience divine silence), then it seems that he would provide all 
who experience divine silence access to mediated experiences of God. 
Rea’s position is that the widely and readily accessible way of finding God 
and experiencing his presence despite silence is mediated experiences 
of God made available by Christian Scripture and liturgy. It seems 
implausible, however, to think that all people for whom God is hidden 
currently have access to Christian Scripture and liturgy (to say nothing 
of people in the past). It is an uncontroversial fact that many people have 
no access to Christian Scripture or the Christian church. Further, many 
instances of divine hiddenness cited by proponents of arguments from 
hiddenness are people who do not have access to these means of indirect 
experience of God. In Schellenberg’s initial defence of the argument 
from hiddenness, for example, he puts forward as examples of divine 
hiddenness ‘individuals – primarily from non-Western cultures – who 
have never so much as entertained the proposition “God exists”’.14
So even if people who experience divine silence can find God and have 
mediated experiences of his presence via Scripture and liturgy (contra my 
case above), divine silence is not thereby shown to be compatible with 
divine concern if there are people who experience divine silence and 
who don’t have access to Christian Scripture or liturgy. For Rea to defend 
the compatibility of divine silence and divine concern, the means of 
mediated experiences of God must be available for all who experience 
hiddenness; otherwise there will be individuals who ‘have been entirely 
cut off from God’s presence’, and for whom God ‘has done or permitted 
14 Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, p. 58.
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something that is both devastatingly harmful ... and totally out of [their] 
control’. Rea has not, however, given any defence of the claim that all 
who experience hiddenness have access to Christian scripture and 
liturgy; further, to defend this claim would be a difficult task in light of 
the experience of many who have no access to Christian Scripture and 
liturgy and seem to be exemplar cases of divine hiddenness.
§7. CONCLUSION
I have attempted to show that the response to the problem of hiddenness 
given by Rea is unsuccessful for a  number of reasons. This is not to 
say that the argument from hiddenness Rea develops gives evidential 
support for the conclusion that a perfectly good God doesn’t exist. There 
are a number of other theistic responses to the problem of hiddenness 
on offer.15 But theists looking for an adequate response to the problem 
of hiddenness will need to look to one or more of these other accounts, 
rather than the one critiqued here.16 
15 To begin looking at theistic responses to the problem of hiddenness, here are some 
suggestions (this list is not meant to be exhaustive): Thomas V. Morris, ‘The Hidden 
God’, Philosophical Topics, XVI, no. 2 (1988), 5–21; Michael Murray, ‘Coercion and 
the Hiddenness of God’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 30, no. 1 (1993), 27–38; 
Daniel Howard-Snyder, ‘The Argument from Divine Hiddenness’, Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy, 26, no. 3 (1996), 433–453; Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of Evil; 
Daniel Howard-Snyder and Paul Moser, eds., Divine Hiddenness: New Essays (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002); C. Stephen Evans, ‘Can God Be Hidden and Evident 
at the Same Time? Some Kierkegaardian Reflections’, Faith and Philosophy, 23, no. 3 
(2006), 241–253; Ted Poston and Trent Dougherty, ‘Divine Hiddenness and the Nature 
of Belief ’, Religious Studies, 43 (2007), 183–198; Andrew Cullison, ‘Two Solutions to 
the Problem of Divine Hiddenness’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 47, no. 2 (2010), 
119–134; Travis Dumsday, ‘Divine Hiddenness as Divine Mercy’, Religious Studies, 48 
(2012), 183–198; Travis Dumsday, ‘Divine Hiddenness and Creaturely Resentment’, 
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 77 (2012), 41–51; Justin McBrayer and 
Philip Swenson, ‘Scepticism About the Argument from Divine Hiddenness’, Religious 
Studies, 48 (2012), 129–150.
16 I would like to thank Michael Rea for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this 
paper.
